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1 Introduction
This report aims to construct a simple model of consumer detriment that can
be used to empirically estimate the loss in consumer surplus that arises when
consumers have imperfect information on the terms of trade. In particular, we
were asked by the OFT to derive a simple measure of consumer detriment in
the following two cases.
² Case 1: Imperfect price information. Consumers cannot perfectly
observe prices.
² Case 2: Imperfect output observation. Consumers lack relevant in-
formation about the characteristics (hereafter, referred to as \quality") of
the products sold in the market.
In this report we will treat the two cases separately, that is we shall assume
that either consumers cannot observe the prices of a good of known quality or
they observe prices but lack knowledge of the quality itself. This will allow
us to better disentangle the e®ects of the two forms of imperfect information
and to construct simple measures of consumer detriment in each of the two
cases. Moreover, we shall treat quality as exogenous and focus on the e®ects of
imperfect consumer information about the level of prices and outputs.
We de¯ne as consumer detriment (hereafter CD) the loss in consumer
surplus that consumers experience due to the presence of imperfect information.
That is, the consumer detriment is taken as the di®erence in consumer surplus
between a situation where consumers are fully informed and a situation where
consumers' information is imperfect.1
For the case when consumers are not perfectly informed about prices (im-
perfect price information) and gathering information is costly, the \law of one
price", according to which identical products must be sold at the same price,
may not hold. Firms have incentives to create price dispersion in order to in-
crease the consumers' cost of ¯nding better deals and enjoy some degree of
monopoly power. In these circumstances, the consumer detriment arises be-
cause consumers may not buy the product at the cheapest price available in
the market, or more precisely, at the price that would arise in the absence of
imperfect information.
For the case when consumers cannot perfectly assess the quality of the prod-
uct (imperfect quality information), the consumers' choice over the quantity to
purchase - at any given price - may not be appropriate for their real needs.
Moreover, the price at which the product is sold in the market may di®er from
the perfect information price.
1The OFT de¯nes CD as the potential to bene¯t consumers by: (i) providing more infor-
mation, (ii) enhancing consumers' understanding of, and propensity to act on, information,
(iii) improving consumers' access to, and the e®ectiveness of , redress.
The approach followed here was suggested by the OFT for operational convenience; it
presumes that all the costs (e.g. search costs) that generate imperfect information can be
avoided at no cost.
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The main problem that is encountered in providing a measure of the con-
sumer detriment that can be estimated with observed data relates to the di±-
culty of predicting what the level of prices and outputs would be if information
were perfect. This is crucial since, as explained above, the level of consumer
detriment depends on the characteristics of the allocation of resources under
perfect information.
Ideally, one would like to be able to infer the perfect information allocation
from the observation of the current set of prices and outputs. This requires
making the following steps.
² Step 1) To identify how prices and outputs vary with the extent of the
consumer information, for any market structure.
² Step 2) To estimate the level of precision in the consumers' information
(i.e. how much consumers know about the distribution of prices in the
economy or how much consumers overestimate/underestimate quality).
² Step 3) To characterize the market structure.
In the case of imperfect information about prices we conclude that Step 1
is unattainable within a reasonable level of reliability. Consequently, we have
chosen to make an assumption on the allocation of resources under perfect
information rather than trying to infer it from the observation of the current
set of prices. In particular, we have provided a measure of consumer detriment
under imperfect information about prices that is based on the assumption that
under perfect information the market would behave competitively (either perfect
competition or monopolistic competition).
To better understand our reasoning, consider how much consumers shop
around before making their purchase decisions. This will depend on the indi-
vidual's search costs (opportunity cost of the time spent in gathering informa-
tion, disutility of e®ort in information collection and processing, cost of delays,
etc.). In turn, the price charged by each individual ¯rm will be a function of
the number of customers it expects to attract at that price as well as its own
characteristics (for example, the level of marginal costs). Hence, there exists
a link between the distribution of search cost in the economy and the level of
prices, and this link will have di®erent characteristics depending on the market
structure and the degree of heterogeneity of consumers and ¯rms. However,
we cannot predict what the prices and hence the market structure would be
if consumers were fully informed, since we are unable to perfectly assess the
distribution of search costs in the economy and how much search costs in°u-
ence consumers' willingness to shop around. Furthermore, minor changes in
the assumptions about the distribution of search costs and the heterogeneity of
consumers lead to profoundly di®erent predictions.
Let us now turn to the case of imperfect quality observation. Here, it is still
the case that the level of consumer detriment depends on the characteristics of
3
the allocation of resources under perfect information and that steps 1 to 3 would
need to be made in order to infer it. For this case we will consider two alternative
approaches that trade o® reliability with obtaining suitable data. The ¯rst
approach is based on the model set out in Consumer Detriment (OFT, 2000)
according to which the level of imperfect information is re°ected in the di®erence
between marginal and average cost at the ¯rm level. Aware of the simpli¯ed
nature of the model, the OFT asked us to review it and to identify possible
shortcomings. We will therefore discuss this model and attempt to provide a
new version, which, while maintaining the same assumptions, overcomes some
of the shortcomings of the original model. The second approach is based on the
argument that trying to derive a theoretical link between variables like prices,
outputs or costs, and the level of information precision may involve a high
loss of generality. We will therefore treat the level of information precision as
exogenous in the theoretical model and use economic models of ¯rms' behavior
to predict the relationship between prices and information (Step 1), for any
given market structure. We will then use an econometric method to measure
the level of information precision in the hands of consumers (Step 2). Finally,
we will suggest that the market structure is chosen on a case by case basis (Step
3).
The rest of the report is organized as follows.
In Section 2 we analyze the case of imperfect price information. In particular,
in Section 2.1 we summarize some of the main ¯ndings of the economic literature
on the e®ects of consumer's imperfect information about prices. These ¯ndings
are then used in Section 2.2. to derive a theoretically consistent measure of
consumer detriment that can be empirically estimated.
In Section 3 we analyze the case of imperfect quality information. Section
3.1 brie°y introduces the issue. A simple model of consumer detriment for this
case was proposed in the OFT report on Consumer Detriment (2000), which we
review in Section 3.2. First, maintaining the assumptions of the model we show
that there is an important component of the consumer detriment that is missing.
Second, we discuss the assumptions of the model and their shortcomings. In
light of this Section 3.3 provides a revised version of the OFTmodel that corrects
for the missing component and relaxes some of the restrictive assumptions of
the original model. Further, we critically review it. In Section 3.4 we propose
an alternative approach to calculate the consumer detriment for the case of
imperfect quality information. In particular, we provide two formulations one
for the short run equilibrium and one for the long run equilibrium. In Section
4 we discuss how to estimate the expressions provided in the report to measure
consumer detriment. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
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2 Imperfect information about prices
2.1 Introduction
The \law of one price", according to which identical products (i.e., homogeneous
products sold at the same location at a given point in time) must be sold at the
same price, does not always hold. In fact, empirical evidence reveals that price
di®erentials for relatively homogeneous goods are a widespread phenomenon.2
Economists recognize that price dispersion for identical products may arise
when consumers are not fully informed about prices in the market and gath-
ering information is costly.3 Indeed, if information were costless, then rational
consumers would search until they ¯nd the best terms of trades available in the
market and perfect information would result. Instead, when information acqui-
sition is costly, then consumers compare the expected marginal bene¯t from an
additional piece of information with the marginal costs (opportunity cost of the
time spent searching, disutility of e®ort in information gathering and processing,
cost of delays, etc.) and some may thus stop searching before the best terms of
trade are found.
In these circumstances, ¯rms can enjoy some degree of monopoly power since
the mobility of consumers is constrained by the cost of ¯nding better deals. In
particular, ¯rms can exploit the lack of information on the part of consumers
by charging higher prices for their products. Moreover, ¯rms may even create
noise in order to increase the costs for consumer to become perfectly informed.
For example, Varian (1980) argues that periodic sales may serve precisely this
purpose.
A brief look at the economic literature on imperfect information about prices
reveals that the allocation of resources in the presence of search costs depends
on a wide range of factors. For example, Diamond (1971) shows that if con-
sumers have the same search costs, these costs are small and ¯rms are identical,
then each ¯rm will act as a local monopolist and monopoly pricing results in
equilibrium with zero price dispersion. However, price dispersion will result ei-
ther when consumers are not identical (for example because they have di®erent
search costs, see Salop, 1977), or when ¯rms have di®erent cost structures (see
for example Reinganum, 1979).4 In particular, Salop (1977) shows that if the
elasticity of market demand is higher for those consumers with lower search
costs, then it may be pro¯table for a monopolist to charge high prices to those
consumers with high search costs and low prices to consumers with low search
costs. A similar analysis is developed in Salop and Stiglitz (1977) for the case
of competition and free entry where a direct link is shown between the level of
search costs and the characteristics of the equilibrium in terms of price disper-
sion. In particular, if costs are low for a su±cient fraction of consumers in the
2See Pratt et al. (1979).
3This point was ¯rst made by Stigler (1961). In his seminal paper he emphasizes that price
dispersion is a measure of consumer ignorance in the market.
4Other models show that price dispersion can arise when consumers di®er ex post in the
number of o®ers received (see for example, Butters 1977) or in their willingness to pay for the
good (Diamond 1987).
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market, then the competitive price will result; if instead search costs are par-
ticularly high then monopoly pricing emerges. Finally, for intermediate levels
of search costs price dispersion will results in the range between the monopoly
price and the competitive one and consumers who search more obtain a better
deal.5
The above analyses suggest that it is not possible to derive a general formu-
lation for the relationship between prices and consumers' search costs. However,
the level of prices in the market tend to increase with the cost of acquiring infor-
mation.6 This is because the higher the search costs, the lower the gain for con-
sumers from searching for a lower price and the higher the degree of monopoly
power that ¯rms can exploit. Therefore, policies devoted to reducing consumers'
search costs can be desirable since they reduce the ¯rms' market power (and
thus the level of prices) resulting from consumers' imperfect information as well
as the waste of resources spent in gathering information. Moreover, an increase
in the percentage of informed consumers increases the level of e®ective compe-
tition in the market. This arises because it becomes less pro¯table for a ¯rm
to raise its price above the perfect information level since those consumers who
are informed will move to the lowest available alternative. This \informational
externality" ampli¯es the impact of a reduction in search costs on the level of
prices and may lead to e®ective competition being restored when a su±cient
number of consumers is informed.7
2.2 A measure of consumer detriment
The OFT proposed that, in order to model the consumer detriment, it would be
convenient to de¯ne it as the di®erence in consumer surplus between the case of
perfect information and that of imperfect information. This was acknowledged
as a simpli¯cation which presumes, amongst other things, that all search costs
can be avoided.
The main problem one encounters in providing a measure of CD for the case
of imperfect information about prices is that the level of consumer detriment
depends on what the allocation of resources (price and output) would be in the
presence of perfect information (the benchmark), and this information is di±-
cult to obtain. The approach we take here is to assume that in the presence of
perfect information the market would be competitive (either perfect competi-
tion or monopolistic competition). Then, we construct a measure of CD that
is based on the observed prices and on the level of marginal (or average) costs,
where the latter convey information about the equilibrium price in presence of
5This model for homogeneous good is generalised by Sadanand andWilde (1982) to the case
where consumers do not know the distribution of prices. See also Rob (1985) for the derivation
of an equilibrium with identical ¯rms and price dispersion in the presence of hetereogeneous
consumers.
6For a simple proof of why this is the case, see Shy (1995).
7See for example Salop and Stiglitz (1977) and Rob (1985).
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perfect information. In this setting, any divergence of prices from the com-
petitive (perfect information) level is attributed to the existence of imperfect
information. Search costs allow the ¯rms to enjoy some degree of monopoly
power since the mobility of the consumers is constrained by the costs of ¯nding
a better deal.
An alternative is to build a framework to predict how equilibrium prices and
outputs under perfect information translate in a world of imperfect information
for any given market structure and then use empirical data to try to infer which
market structure matches the prediction. We have chosen not to follow this
approach because it is not robust to changes in the functional forms chosen to
represent the distribution of search costs and the heterogeneity of consumers
and ¯rms, which could involve a high loss of generality. As brie°y explained in
the previous section, the characteristics of the equilibrium under price dispersion
vary considerably according to consumers and ¯rms' characteristics as well as
the distribution of search costs.
Further discussion on the pros and cons of our approach is developed at the
end of this section.
Perfect Information about prices
Denote by p = D(Q; ¢) the demand function and by p¤ the equilibrium
price, the corresponding level of output sold in the industry is given by Q¤ =
D¡1(p¤:¢): The number of ¯rms in the market under perfect information is
denoted by m; q¤j is the level of output sold by the j ¡ th ¯rm in the market,
where
Pm
j=1 q
¤
j = Q
¤. All ¯rms in the market under perfect information are
identical. In this setting, denoting by AC(qj) the average costs curve of the
j ¡ th ¯rm, the ¯rm's equilibrium pro¯t is
¼¤j =
£
p¤ ¡AC(q¤j )
¤
q¤j
where in light of the assumptions made, q¤j = q
¤ and ¼¤j = ¼
¤ for all j = 1; ::m:
By now, we assume that the perfect information industry structure is one
of perfect competition so that p¤ = MC = minAC; the case of monopolistic
competition will be further discussed.
In light of this we can calculate the consumer surplus in the presence of
perfect information. Denoting by p0; the level of price at which the demand
tends to zero and linearly approximating the demand function, we obtain
CS¤ =
1
2
mX
j=1
¡
p0 ¡ p¤¢ q¤j (1)
Imperfect Information about prices
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Now, consider the case where consumers are imperfectly informed about
prices and price dispersion arises for homogeneous goods. Denote by pi, for
i = 1; 2..n the price charged by the i ¡ th company (or i ¡ th shop) under
imperfect information, where
p1 · p2 · :::: · pi:::: · pn (2)
and where n denotes the number of ¯rms in the industry. Further, denote by qi
the quantity sold at price pi by ¯rm i:
In order to measure the e®ect of imperfect price information on the level
of consumer surplus we would need to know the characteristics of the demand
schedule when consumers have positive search costs, for the amount of output
consumers are willing to buy at any given price depends on the distribution of
search costs. Under imperfect price information each consumer minimizes the
total expected cost of buying a unit of a commodity and this includes both the
price of the good and the search cost . It follows that a consumer's reservation
price depends on the cost of searching, the utility of the product to the consumer
and the consumer's knowledge about the distribution of prices. In this respect,
it is di±cult to build an expression for the level of consumer surplus under
imperfect price observation that could hold with a reasonable level of generality.
In light of this, our approach is to capture the extent of the consumer detri-
ment at the ¯rm level and assume that n = m: When compared to a situation
where consumers are fully informed, imperfect price information generates two
main e®ects on the equilibrium level of prices and outputs. First, those con-
sumers who address ¯rm i pay a price pi rather than p
¤; where pi ¸ p¤, over the
qi units of output they purchase. Second the number of units bought from each
individual ¯rm is likely to be lower than under perfect information (qi · q¤)
since the cost of buying (which includes the search costs) is higher. Hence, for
each ¯rm, over (q¤ ¡ qi) units of outputs consumers bear a further loss: With
the help of Figure 1, we can provide a measure of the consumer detriment that
accounts for both these components: in particular, area A represents the ¯rst
e®ect, while area B captures the second. The level of approximation is re°ected
in the fact that the marginal bene¯t function for the consumer under perfect
and imperfect information will not be the same. Therefore, the areas in ¯gure
1 measure imperfectly the level of consumer detriment at ¯rm level. Moreover,
the assumption that the number of ¯rms is the same under perfect and imperfect
information may involve some loss of generality, for it may be the case that the
positive level of pro¯ts under imperfect information attracts new ¯rms in the
market. However, in the absence of a reliable relationship between the level of
prices, the distribution of search costs and the number of ¯rms in the industry,
this simpli¯cation can hardly be avoided.
Following from the above discussion, the measure of consumer detriment
that we suggest is given by
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CD =
nX
i=j=1
·
(pi ¡ p¤)qi + 1
2
(pi ¡ p¤)(q¤j ¡ qi)
¸
(3)
Note that in case the total industry demand is rather inelastic, that is, the
number of units consumers purchase is independent of the level of imperfect
information, than the second e®ect described above would be irrelevant in ag-
gregate. In this case, our measure of the consumer detriment would amount
to
CD =
nX
i=1
[(pi ¡ p¤)qi] (4)
Rearranging expression (3) we obtain
CD =
1
2
nX
i=j=1
¡
piqi + piq
¤
j ¡ p¤q¤j ¡ p¤qi
¢
(5)
Denoting by R¤ and Ri the revenues of each individual ¯rm under perfect
and imperfect information, respectively, expression (5) yields:
CD =
1
2
nX
i=1
µ
Ri ¡R¤ + R
¤pi
p¤
¡ Rip
¤
pi
¶
which is equal to:
CD =
1
2
nX
i=1
µ
Ri
µ
pi ¡ p¤
pi
¶
+R¤
µ
pi ¡ p¤
p¤
¶¶
(6)
Taking into account that p¤ is equal to marginal costs under perfect infor-
mation and assuming that the ¯rms' cost structure under perfect and imperfect
information does not signi¯cantly di®er (we will relax this assumption later),
we can rewrite expression (6) becomes
CD =
1
2
nX
i=1
µ
Ri
µ
pi ¡MCi
pi
¶
+R¤
µ
pi ¡MCi
MC
¶¶
(7)
Note that in case the number of units consumers purchase is independent of the
level of imperfect information, then from expression (4) the level of CD would
amount to only the ¯rs term in expression (7).
Moreover, under the assumption that all ¯rms are identical and there are
constant returns to scale, MCi = ACi; expression becomes
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CD =
1
2
nX
i=1
µ
Ri
µ
pi ¡ACi
pi
¶
+R¤
µ
pi ¡ACi
ACi
¶¶
Multiplying the terms in the round bracket by qi and noting that (pi ¡ACi) qi =
¼i :
CD =
1
2
nX
i=1
µ
¼i
µ
1 +
R¤
Ci
¶¶
(8)
where Ci = ACiqi is the total cost of ¯rm i:
In this case. pur measure of the consumer detriment would amount to
Notice that the above formula also holds in the presence of monopolistic
competition. In this case p¤ = AC(q¤) while in the presence of imperfect in-
formation pi ¸ AC(qi): Since consumer detriment is expressed at ¯rm level, we
can assume that qi ¡ q¤ is small and approximate AC(qi) with AC(q¤); which
leads to (8).
Further, notice that since each price must lie between the competitive price
and the monopoly price we can also ¯nd the lower and upper bound of the
consumer detriment. Denote the former by CD and the latter by CD, we
obtain:
CD = 0
since pi = p¤ for all i; and, from (3):
CD =
·
n
¡
pM ¡ p¤¢ qM + 1
2
£
n
¡
pM ¡ p¤¢ ¡q¤ ¡ qM¢¤¸ (9)
where pM is the monopoly price, QM the monopoly output and qM = Q
M
n is
the level of output produced by each individual ¯rm. Expression (9) coincides
with Harberger's calculation of the consumer loss under monopoly pricing (since
the welfare loss is equal to consumer detriment minus pro¯ts).8 In fact, setting
p¤ = MC = AC; the term in the second square bracket is equal to ¼
M
2 ; where
¼M denotes the monopoly pro¯ts, and overall:
CD =
·
¼M
2
+ ¼M
¸
=
3¼M
2
8From " = p
M
QM
¢p
¢Q;
, where ¢p = pM ¡ p¤ and ¢Q = Q¤ ¡QM ; rewrite ¢Q = "QM¢p
pM
and substitute for ¢Q in ¢Q¢p
2
to obtain: ¢p
p
"QM¢p
2
: Since, under monopoly ¢p
p
= 1
"
and
since QM¢p = ¼M ; (since p¤ = AC) the result follows.
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This results is in line with the study by Diamond (1971), who shows that
imperfect price information can result in monopoly prices.
In the above formulation, we have considered the case where all ¯rms have
similar cost structure so that p¤ is equal to the MC of a representative ¯rm.
This case is consistent with the ¯ndings of the economic literature on the equilib-
rium under imperfect information that shows how price dispersion may arise in
the presence of heterogeneity between consumers even if all ¯rms are identical.
However, in her paper of 1987, Reinganum shows that under costly informa-
tion acquisition, imperfect information may result in price dispersion also when
¯rms have di®erent marginal costs.9 This suggests that when the assumption
of similar cost functions across ¯rms is not con¯rmed by the data, the following
alternative measure of consumer detriment can be used
Denote by MC¤ the marginal costs of a representative ¯rm under perfect
competition: Denote byMCi the marginal costs of the i¡th ¯rm in the presence
of imperfect competition. Further, denote byMC andMC the lower and upper-
bound ofMCi, that is: MCi 2 [MC,MC]:We assume that the lowest marginal
cost ¯rm in the presence of imperfect information has the same marginal costs
as the most e±cient ¯rm under imperfect information, that is: MC¤ = MC;
which implies p¤ =MC: Then expression (6) becomes:
CD =
nX
i=1
1
2
µ
Ri
µ
1¡ MC
pi
¶
+R¤
µ
pi
MC
¡ 1
¶¶
Letting ®i =
MCi
MC , where ® · 1; we obtain:
CD =
nX
i=1
1
2
µ
Ri
µ
1¡ ®iMCi
pi
¶
+R¤
µ
1
®
pi
MCi
¡ 1
¶¶
(10)
A critical review of the approach
² The advantages of our formulation, which leads to equations (7), (8), (10),
are that it does not rely on any assumption on the distribution of prices
or of search costs among consumers. Moreover, it does not require the
estimate of prices.
9A priori we cannot say whether price dispersion will decrease, increase or remain con-
stant over time. Whether or not price dispersion will persist in the long run depends on the
incentives for ¯rms to invest in R&D activities so as to reduce their costs. In particular,
Reinganum shows that seller's pro¯ts increase with a reduction in marginal costs (or average
costs); moreover the marginal bene¯ts are greater the lower the initial level of marginal costs.
Since it is likely that marginal costs of cost reduction also increases as AC increases, it is not
clear cut whether the optimal rate of AC reduction is increasing, decreasing or constant in
AC. If it is increasing (decreasing) then cost dispersion is expected to reduce (increase) over
time and so will price dispersion. If it is constant, then price dispersion will persist in the
long run.
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² The level of approximation in our formulation is re°ected in the fact that
the CD, as stated, does not include the cost of searching and process-
ing information. Thus, in this respect, our measure will underestimate
the impact on consumer surplus of measures which reduce search costs.
Moreover, the assumption that the number of ¯rms is the same under
perfect and imperfect information makes our measure of consumer detri-
ment as representative of the loss in consumer surplus that arises because
the ¯rms in the market do not charge the perfect information price and
therefore, in this respect, the CD estimated above is likely to overestimate
CD in practice.
² Although we have thought it to be inappropriate to postulate a functional
form for the price-search costs relationship, it must be taken into account
that such a relationship is likely to exist, as emphasized by the economic
literature.10 In particular, the level of price dispersion measured by the
di®erence between the minimum and the maximum price charged, tends
to increase with the costs of information gathering and individual prices
also tend to increase in the level of search costs.11 Since our measures of
the consumer detriment are an increasing function of the general level of
prices, CD is likely to increase with the level of search costs.
² As explained in the previous section, our formulation does not allow us
to disentangle the level of market power due to anti-competitive behav-
ior from that related to the existence of imperfect information. This is
because our benchmark case is either one of perfect competition or of
monopolistic competition. This restriction was necessary in order to pro-
vide a proxy for the perfect information price (p¤). Therefore, it must
be taken into account that our measures of CD could overestimate the
loss in consumer surplus due to imperfect information whereas the perfect
information structure were not competitive.
² We have restricted the attention to the case of a homogenous product
market. In fact, consumer detriment may arise also in the presence of
heterogeneous products, for the price dispersion, which is natural in these
forms of markets, may be excessive with respect to what would be justi-
¯ed by the existence of di®erences in product characteristics. However,
the di±culty of \measuring" product characteristics as well plausible dif-
ferences in the consumers' tastes suggest that our simpli¯cation may be
di±cult to avoid.
Estimation
In the analysis above we have provided three alternative expressions for CD
as given by formulas (7), (8), (10) and carefully explained the assumptions
underlying each of them. In Section 4. we suggest how to estimate them.
10See for example Salop and Stiglitz (1977) and Rob (1985).
11For a simple proof of why this is the case, see Shy (1995).
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3 Imperfect information about quality
3.1 Introduction
A second kind of consumer imperfect information about the terms of trade refers
to the possibility that consumers lack detailed knowledge about the quality of
the products sold in the market.
In his seminal paper, Spence (1977) shows that when consumers consistently
underestimate the probability of product failure, even a competitive market will
operate ine±ciently.12 Subsequent analyses on the relationship between prices
and imperfect quality information discuss the variety of factors that a®ect the
performance of market under imperfect quality information. These include the
market structure, the possibility of signalling quality through prices, adver-
tising, warranties or investment in research and development and the level of
consumers' search costs as well as the ¯rm's reputational concern.13 For an ex-
cellent survey see Stiglitz (1987). It must be noted though that in practice price
signalling provides consumers with imprecise information at best.14 Similarly,
consumers relying on producer reputation or warranties may misestimate the
value of the guarantee or service contract as a signal of reliability and choose
inadequate or excessive protection.
A main insight of this literature is that the most serious cases of concern
about imperfect quality information are related to those situations where con-
sumers are unable to easily verify thorough experience the performance of the
product attributes and producer's reputation plays a limited rule. Imperfect
quality information is therefore a particularly severe problem for infrequently
purchased experience goods and for credence goods, where consumers only have
an imprecise estimate of quality obtained from sources such as direct obser-
vation, brand name, word-of-mouth communication and repeated purchase.15
Experience goods are de¯ned as products whose quality can be ascertained only
after purchase. Examples may include drinks, home maintenance and repairs.
Credence goods are products whose quality cannot be veri¯ed by consumers
even after purchase. Examples may include properties of food, drugs or cos-
metics and some kinds of professional services like legal and medical services.
Moreover, some credence goods, like medical and legal services or repair ser-
vices, su®er from the problem that the seller is also the expert who determined
how much of the service is needed. Thus, imperfect information about quality
creates obvious incentives for opportunistic behavior by the sellers.16
12However, the ¯rst best allocation of resources can be achieved by imposing liability on the
producer. In particular, if consumers are risk neutral, making producers liable for the full loss
experienced by consumers when product fails yields a ¯rst best outcome. Instead, if consumers
are risk averse, the optimal level of insurance does not guarantee enough incentives for product
liability . Therefore, producer liability towards the consumers should be supplemented with
producer liability towards the state.
13See for example Bagwell and Riordan (1991).
14See the empirical study by Hjorth-Andersen's (1991).
15For a more detailed discussion of the cases where imperfect quality information is likely
to be a severe problem, see for example Ramsey (1985).
16A study by the Federal Trade Commission (1980) on the optometry industry documents
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The OFT model of consumer detriment, which was included in the Consumer
Detriment report (2000), aims at calculating the loss in consumer surplus due
to presence of imperfect information about quality. In view of the complicated
nature of the task, the OFT asked us to help them to identify any shortcomings
of their approach, which models CD in a similar way to monopoly rent, and to
suggest ways in which it could be improved. In light of this, the next sections
are devoted to review the OFT model, correct some of its shortcoming and then
propose a new and alternative approach to measure CD.
3.2 Review of the OFT model
The OFT model, included in the Consumer Detriment report (2000), aims at
calculating the loss in consumer surplus that arises in the presence of imperfect
information about quality; quality is assumed exogenous. In particular, it con-
siders the case where consumers overestimate the quality of the product sold
in the market and hence there exists a positive di®erence between the observed
level of demand and the level of demand that would arise in the absence of
quality misperception. Concentrating on the case where consumers overesti-
mate the quality of the product can appear unduly restrictive. However, we do
agree with the OFT that this is the most relevant case, since when consumers
underestimate the quality of the product, ¯rms have strong incentives to con-
vey the positive information about their products to consumers, via warranties,
product liability self regulations and low prices to induce learning via repeated
purchases. Moreover, in the case where consumers under-estimate the quality of
the product, there is less concern about consumer detriment. Indeed, consumers
may bene¯t from ¯rms charging prices that are lower than under perfect quality
information, although the optimal level of output will not be produced.
In the setting, the main assumptions of the OFT model are the following.
A1 The market structure under perfect information and in the presence of the
information shortfall is a monopoly.
A2 The pro¯t of the monopolistic ¯rm are not a®ected by the presence of
the information shortfall. In particular, it is assumed that, when the
observed demand lies above the true demand, the threat of entry induces
the monopolistic ¯rm to spend a ¯xed amount of resources in order to
make entry unpro¯table.17
A3 Under perfect information, the monopolistic ¯rm enjoys constant returns
to scale (MC = AC). Under imperfect information, average costs raise
because of the ¯xed amount of resources spent by the incumbent to deter
a consistent tendency of optometrists to prescribe unnecessary treatments. For a study on
the rationale for sellers' opportunistic behaviors and the performance of markets for credence
goods under di®erent assumptions on the level of search costs, market competition and repu-
tational concerns, see for example Wolinsky (1993) and Emons (2001).
17Although it is argued that the model accounts for both the case where entry takes place
and when it does not, the model is compatible only with the ¯rst situtation since qd is taken
as a measure of the incument's output and not the total indutry output.
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entry. As a consequence AC > MC and the di®erence between AC and
MC is taken as a measure of the information shortfall (distance between
observed demand and true demand).
Under these assumptions, the equilibrium is characterized by a higher price
(pd) and a higher quantity (qd) with respect to the case of perfect information
(pm; qm).
There are a number of criticisms which may be directed at the OFT model,
and these follow below.
a) Given the assumptions in the model, there is an important component of
the Consumer Detriment calculation that is missing.
In particular, the increase in price and output above the perfect information
level produces two e®ects on consumer surplus. First, consumers pay a higher
price (pd rather than pm) over qm units of output. Second, over qd ¡ qm units
of output consumers pay a price pd that is greater than their willingness to pay
for those units as given by the area underneath the true demand curve between
qd ¡ qm.18 In the existing model the ¯rst component is not fully taken into
account and therefore consumer detriment is under-estimated.
Following the OFT, the Consumer Detriment is de¯ned as the di®erence in
consumer surplus between the case of perfect information (and the true demand
coincides with the observed demand) and that of imperfect information, which
in the case analyzed by the OFT occurs when the observed demand lies above
the true demand. With the help of Figure 2, which reproduces the case analyses
in the OFT model, we can easily identify the consumer surplus in each of these
two cases. In particular19:
Consumer Surplus under (pm; qm) = A+B +D¡D = A+B
Consumer Surplus under (pd; qd) = A+B+D+F ¡(B+C+D+E+F ) =
A¡C ¡E
The consumer detriment (CD), which is the loss in consumer surplus due
to the existence of imperfect information is obtained by taking the di®erence
between the consumer surplus under (pm; qm) and the consumer surplus under
(pd; qd). This yields
CD = B +C +E
In the OFT model the consumer detriment is determined as the sum of the areas
C and E; consequently part of the loss in consumer surplus due to the increase
in price over qm units of output is missing (area B):
18Implicit in this formulation is the assumption that income e®ects are small so that we can
use the Marshallian demand to measure consumer surplus.
19Notice that in both cases the willingness to pay of consumers is given by the area under-
neath the true demand curve.
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b) The model restricts attention to the case of an incumbent monopolist
(A1), and this seems too restrictive, because monopoly is unlikely to be
the representative industry structure.
c) The model is based on the assumption that in the absence of the informa-
tion shortfall, the monopolist's marginal cost and average cost are constant
(A3). As the information shortfall occurs, the incumbent incurs additional
costs in order to protect its pro¯ts from the threat of entry. These costs
are assumed to be independent of the quantity produced so that AC raise
above MC and their the divergence results in a measure of the extent of
the information shortfall. However, there can be other factors that create
a divergence between marginal costs and average costs and, in the present
formulation, it would be impossible to distinguish them.
d) The entire model would equally apply to a situation where the monopo-
list faces a real increase in demand. As a result there is a clear risk of
overestimating consumer detriment.
e) Consumer detriment, as given by expression (21) in the OFT model is a
function of the price level pd, which may be di±cult to estimate.
f) Equation (16) in the OFT model takes ¢qd as a proxy for qd ¡ qm; it
implies that qd¡qm is zero when pd = pm. However, in the presence of an
information shortfall, the level of equilibrium output may vary even when
the price remains constant. Therefore, equation (16) involves some loss of
generality.
3.3 A revised OFT model
As explained in the previous section, the Consumer Detriment amounts to the
sum of the areas B;C and E in ¯gure 1, that is:
CD = ¢pdQd +
(¢Qd)
2
2
@p
@Q
(11)
where the ¯rst term is the sum of the areas B and C, while the second term is
the area E in ¯gure 2. Now, consider the expression (16) in the OFT model,
which represents an estimate of the elasticity of demand in absolute value. In
the presence of n identical ¯rms in the market, it becomes
"d =
@Q
@p
pd
Qd
¼ ¢Qd
¢pd
pd
Qd
=
(Qd ¡Qm)
¢Pd
pd
Qd
¼ (qd ¡ qm)
¢Pd
pd
qm
(12)
In light of this we can rewrite (11) as follows
CD = ¢pdQd +
¢Qd¢Pd
2
(13)
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or, equivalently
CD = ¢pdQd +
(¢pd)
2
Qd"d
2pd
(14)
Moreover, (12) implies
¢Qd = (Qd ¡Qm) = "d¢PdQm
pd
¼ "d¢PdQd
pd
(15)
Now, consider expression (15) in the OFT model, which is derived under the
assumption that the individual ¯rm's pro¯t are not a®ected by the existence of
imperfect information since the individual ¯rm incurs additional costs in order
to deter entry.
¢pd = pd ¡ pm = (ACd ¡MC) + ¼d
µ
1
qd
¡ 1
qm
¶
(16)
Substituting (12) into (16) and rearranging, we obtain expression (17) in the
OFT model, that is
¢pd =
(ACd ¡MC)
1 + ¼d"dpdqd
(17)
Substituting for (17) into (14) (or, equivalently, substituting for 17 and 15
into 13) :
CD =
(ACdQd ¡MCQd)
1 + ¼d"dpdqd
+
1
2
"
(ACdQd ¡MCQd)
1 + ¼d"dpdqd
#2
Q2d"d
pdQd
Moreover, since ACdQd¡MCQd = ¡pQd+ACdQd+ pQd¡MCQd; which
in turns is equal to (pd¡MC)pd pdQ¡
P
n ¼d; we obtain
CD =
³
(pd¡MC)
pd
pdQ¡
P
n ¼d
´
1 + ¼d"dpdqd
+
1
2
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³
(pd¡MC)
pd
pdQ¡
P
n ¼d
´
1 + ¼d"dpdqd
352 Q2d"d
pdQd
(18)
Assuming that each of the i¡ th ¯rm in the market is pro¯t maximizing20:
d¼d
dqd
= pd + qd
dpd
dQd
(1 + ¸)¡MC = 0 (19)
20Notice that the OFT limit pricing model is based on the assumptins that ¯rms set prices
optimally (i.e. to maximise pro¯ts), but then engage in cost increasing activities to make
entry unpro¯table.
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where ¸ = d(q¡d)dqd is the conjectural variation parameter, and q¡d represents the
output of all ¯rms except ¯rm i. From (19) :
pd ¡MC
pd
= ¡ qd
pd
dpd
dQd
(1 + ¸)
which taking into account that qd =
Qd
n ; implies (for ¸ 6= 1)
"d =
pd
pd ¡MC
1 + ¸
n
Substituting for the above into (18)
CD =
³
(pd¡MC)
pd
pdQ¡
P
n ¼d
´
1 + ¼dpdQd
pd
pd¡MC (1 + ¸)
+
1
2
"
(pd¡MC)
pd
pdQ¡
P
n ¼d
1 + ¼dpdQd
pd
pd¡MC (1 + ¸)
#2
pd
pd ¡MC
1 + ¸
npdQd
(20)
The use of conjectural variation allows us to adapt the model to di®erent
industry structures. In particular, the case of a monopoly analyzed by the OFT
can be obtained by setting n = 1 and ¸ = 0:21 The resulting expression for the
consumer detriment is the same as in the presence of collusive behavior between
the n ¯rms in the market, as it can be noticed by setting ¸ = n¡ 1: The case of
quantity competition a' la Cournot can be analyzed by setting ¸ = 0. Finally,
the case of ¸ = ¡1; which represents Bertrand competition leading to a perfectly
competitive outcome with p =MC; cannot be analyzed in this setting for at the
price equals to marginal costs ¯rm make losses. However, expression (18) for
¸!¡1; may help understanding the performance of competitive, although not
perfectly, industries. In particular, the case of monopolistic competition can be
analyzed from expression (18) under the condition ¼ = 0:
IMPROVEMENTS ON THE OFT MODEL
With respect to expression (21) in the OFT model, the following improve-
ments have been achieved:
² The measure of the consumer detriment has been adjusted for the missing
component (see point a in the previous section) in the OFT model.
² The model has been extended to industry structures other than monopoly
(see point b in the previous section).
² Expression (20) does not require a price estimate (see point e in the pre-
vious section), for prices appear only in the mark-up and in the total
revenues, which can be estimated.
21Notice that the second term in the above expression coincides with expression (21) in the
OFT model; the ¯rst term accounts for the missing component (point a above).
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LIMITS
² Criticisms (c), (d), (f) remain.
Estimation
In this section we have provided a measure of consumer detriment for the
case of imperfect information about quality, along the lines suggested by the
OFT model. See Section 4 for a discussion on how to estimate expressions (18)
and (20)
3.4 A new approach
When consumers are imperfectly informed about the quality of the products,
the observed market demand and the demand of a fully informed agent do
not coincide. In particular, when consumers overestimate quality, which is the
case analyzed here, the true demand schedule lies below the observed demand
schedule and consumer detriment may arise for reasons described in the previous
section.
In order to provide a measure of consumer detriment for this case, we need
to make the following steps (as anticipated in the introduction).
² Step 1) To draw a one to one correspondence between information struc-
ture and prices (output), for any market structure,
² Step 2) To estimate the information structure, that is the level of pre-
cision in the consumers' information (i.e. how much consumers overesti-
mate/underestimate quality).
² Step 3) To characterize the market structure.
In order to make Step 1, we assume that consumers can observe prices, so
that price dispersion does not arise for identical products. Under this assump-
tion, the equilibrium price in the market will mainly be dictated by the level of
observed demand and we can use economic models to predict how the allocation
of resources varies with the level of demand. This implies that if we are able to
make Step 2, that is to estimate the divergence between the observed demand
and the true demand, then we can determine the e®ect of imperfect information
about prices and outputs, for any given market structure.
In order to determine the level of precision of consumers' information (step
2), two alternative approaches can be followed. The ¯rst one consists of viewing
the consumers' level of information precision as dependent of some observable
variables. Assuming a precise functional form for this relationship we can then
use the observable variables to derive an estimate of the consumer's level of in-
formation precision.22 For example, one could argue that the level of precision
22This is the approach followed by the OFT in the research paper Consumer Detriment
(2000), where it is argued that the level of information precision can be measured by the
di®erence between average and marginal costs.
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on the product quality is (inversely) related to the level of informative advertis-
ing, according to some assumed function, and then use the data on advertising
to derive an estimate of the level of imperfect information. This approach would
re°ect the so called partial view in the economic literature that sees advertising
as an informative device that helps consumers to make rational choices.
However, we believe that this approach might involve a high loss of precision
and could yield inappropriate policy implications. Our reasoning is based on
the following considerations. Advertising may in fact be informative but only on
the `positive' quality of the good being advertised; negative information may be
withheld. Firms may also create `arti¯cial' product di®erentiation. Moreover,
the advertising of a product has strong psychological and sociological aspects
that go beyond optimal inference of objective quality. Advertising agencies
often appeal to the consumers' desire for social recognition and a trendy life
style. This is the so called adverse view which argues that advertising fools
consumers and induces them to overestimate the quality of a product as well as
its level of di®erentiation.
In light of this it should appear clear that any attempt to specify a functional
form for the relationship between the level of advertising and the degree of
precision of the consumer's information would be rather arbitrary and could
involve a high loss of accountability. Moreover, it would lead drastic policy
implications such as a suggestion that the consumer detriment due to imperfect
information could disappear if the optimal (arbitrary chosen though!) level of
advertising were imposed on ¯rms.
Therefore, we prefer to suggest an alternative approach, which consists in
treating the level of imperfect information as exogenous in the theoretical model
and restricting ourselves to the derivation of the level of consumer detriment
given the level of imperfect information. Then, in Section 4 we describe a tech-
nique to measure the level of imperfect information empirically. This technique
is based on the presumption that cases where consumers under-estimate the
quality of a product are less likely to occur, for ¯rms have incentives to avoid
it. Hence, either via informative advertising, or via provision of warranties or
even through voluntary certi¯cation of a minimum quality standard ¯rms will
manage to convey the positive information about their products.
Finally, we characterize the market structure (Step 3) on a case by case basis
and use this to select the appropriate model of ¯rms interaction.
3.4.1 A measure of consumer detriment
Denote by µ the level of imperfect information, as given by the vertical di®erence
between the observed demand schedule and the true demand schedule, which
are assumed to be parallel. We assume that ¯rms make their price and output
decisions on the basis of the observed demand and not the true demand. Further,
we assume that the structure of the market under perfect information is the same
as that under imperfect information. Under these assumptions we can calculate
the optimal price (quantities) ¯rms will charge (supply) for any level of demand
and hence also for the case where the observed demand coincides with the true
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demand.
We construct a quantity competition model with conjectural variations in
order to formalize the relationship between the equilibrium price and the level
of market demand. As is known, di®erent values of the conjectural parameter
represent di®erent oligopoly model and are consistent with market performance
ranging from perfect competition to monopoly. In this setting we consider both
a short run equilibrium with no entry and a long run equilibrium when entry
occurs.
case a Conjectural Variation model
² No entry
Consider an industry with n ¯rms (n ¸ 1) supplying a homogeneous product.
The pro¯t function of each ¯rm is
¼i = p(Q; s; µ)qi ¡Ci(qi)
where p(Q; s; µ) is the market demand, that depends on the total output Q on
the true quality s and on the consumer's over-estimate of quality µ. Moreover,
Q = qi + q¡i; where qi is the i ¡ th ¯rm's level of output and q¡i is the total
level of output of all ¯rms except ¯rm i. It follows that the ¯rst order condition
for pro¯t maximization is:
d¼i
dqi
= p(Q; s; µ)¡ dC(qi)
dqi
+
dp
dqi
qi = 0
where:
dp
dqi
=
dp
dQ
µ
dqi
dqi
+
dq¡i
dqi
¶
Let ¸i =
dq¡i
dqi
, where ¸i represent the conjectural variation term, for simplicity
assumed to be the same across ¯rms: ¸i = ¸ for i = 1; 2::::n: From the ¯rst
order condition, it follows
p¡MCi
p
=
qi
p
dp
dQ
(1 + ¸)
Multiplying the right hand side term by QQ :
p¡MCi
p
=
si
"Q
(1 + ¸) (21)
where "Q = ¡ pQ dQdp is the elasticity of demand in absolute value and si = qiQ is
the i¡ th ¯rm's market share.
We can easily obtain di®erent market performance by letting ¸ assume the
following values:
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Case 1 ¸ = ¡1 : Bertrand duopoly with p ¡ MCi = 0; that is a situation
equivalent to perfect competition
Case 2 ¸ = 0: Cournot duopoly p¡MCip =
si
"Q
which is equal to 1n"Q if all ¯rms
are identical
Case 3 ¸ = n¡ 1: Co-operative behavior with identical ¯rms: p¡MCip = 1"Q
Case 4 ¸ = 0 and n = 1 : monopoly p¡MCip =
1
"Q
We assume that ¯rms set prices and outputs on the basis of the observed
demand level. Therefore, the case where the di®erence between the observed
demand and the true demand is equal to µ is equivalent -in terms of price and
output - to a situation where the ¯rms face an increase in demand equal to µ:
This allows us to calculate the consumer detriment by analyzing how prices and
quantities vary with the level of demand. In particular, given the de¯nition of
CD, the sum of the areas B, C and E in Figure 3, yields:
CD = ¢PQ¡¢Q
µ
¢Q
2
@P
@Q
¶
(22)
it follows that
CD = Q
¢P
¢µ
¢µ ¡ 1
2
µ
¢Q
¢µ
¢µ
¶2
@P
@Q
where, since under perfect information, µ = 0; in the above formula ¢µ = µ:
As µ increases the level of the observed demand raises as well as the level of
imperfect information. Hence, this approach allows us to calculate the consumer
detriment by looking at the variation in output and price following an increase
in demand equal to µ:
For simplicity we restrict the attention to a linear demand function, constant
marginal costs and identical ¯rms. In this setting, we obtain:
@qi
@µ
= ¡¼qµ
¼qq
= ¡ pµ
@p
@Q (1 + ¸+ n)
and
@Qi
@µ
=
X
i
@qi
@µ
= n
@qi
@µ
= ¡ npµ
@p
@Q (1 + ¸+ n)
(23)
Multiplying the numerator and denominator of (23) by µQp and making use of
¢Q = @Qi@µ ¢µ; we obtain
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¢Q
Q
=
n"Q"µ
(1 + ¸+ n)
¢µ
µ
(24)
where "µ =
µ
ppµ is the elasticity of prices with respect to the level of perceived
quality and "Q = ¡ pQ @Q@p is the elasticity of demand (in absolute value) with
respect to the price.
Now consider the e®ect of a change in µ on the equilibrium price level; this
is given by:
dp
dµ
= pµ +
@p
@Q
@Qi
@µ
which in light of (23) yields
dp
dµ
=
pµ (1 + ¸)
(1 + ¸+ n)
and
¢PQ = Q
@p
@µ
¢µ = Q
pµ (1 + ¸)
(1 + ¸+ n)
¢µ
multiplying the above by pp
µ
µ :
¢PQ =
pQ (1 + ¸)
(1 + ¸+ n)
"µ
¢µ
µ
(25)
Now, recall the formula for the consumer detriment (22), multiplying the
second term in the above expression by Q
2
p
p
Q2 ; we can rewrite (22) as follows:
CD = ¢PQ+
1
2
µ
¢Q
Q
¶2
pQ
"Q
Substituting for ¢PQ from (25) and for ¢QQ from (24) in the above formula
and making use of ¢µµ = 1, we obtain:
CD =
pQ (1 + ¸) "µ
(1 + ¸+ n)
+
1
2
µ
n"µ
(1 + ¸+ n)
¶2
pQ"Q (26)
where for ¸ 6= ¡1; "Q = pp¡MCi si (1 + ¸) from expression (21).
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For di®erent values of ¸ we obtain di®erent values of CD. In particular, for
¸ = 0 (Cournot competition)
CD¸=0 =
pQ"µ
(1 + n)
+
1
2
µ
n"µ
(1 + n)
¶2
pQ"Q
Under monopoly (¸ = 0; n = 1)
CD¸=0;n=1 =
pQ"µ
2
+
1
2
³"µ
2
´2
pQ"Q
The above expression also represents the consumer detriment in case of col-
lusion between identical ¯rms (captured by ¸ = n¡ 1):
In the case of Bertrand competition, i.e. perfect competition, we have:
CD¸=¡1 =
1
2
("µ)
2
pQ"Q (27)
² ENTRY
In the previous section entry does not occur. This is a reasonable case when
either sunk costs of entry are su±ciently high or when the level of imperfect
information tends to disappear quickly, so that the original equilibrium is re-
established. In this section we introduce the possibility that new ¯rms enter the
market, when there are sunk costs of entry equal to F:
In order to derive the equilibrium prices and outputs under entry we need
to calculate the equilibrium number of ¯rms in the market, which further high-
lights the need to restrict attention to a very simple model, with linear demand,
identical ¯rms and constant average costs.
When entry is allowed, under the assumptions of our model (see Hamilton,
1999) for a more general case), the equilibrium prices decreases and the long
run equilibrium is characterized by a level of price that is the same as under
perfect information, and a greater level of output. In the appendix we prove
that in this case the consumer detriment amounts to23
CD =
1
2
"Q"
2
µpQ (28)
Notice that the above equation is the same as expression (27), since the price
does not vary and the increase in demand is totally re°ected in the increase in
the quantity produced. However, the value of pQ is clearly di®erent.
Review of the Model
23This expression represents the area ABC in ¯gure 4.
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² Recall point (d) in the previous section. We believe that unless we are able
to assess the extent by which the true demand diverges from the observed
demand we may be mislead in the calculation of CD, in particular, we may
measure as consumer detriment what is in fact is the e®ect of an increase
in the real demand.
² The current formulation is not based on any particular assumption on
the market structure. We can use a case by case approach to evaluate
the market structure and make an appropriate choice of ¸; and then use
the measure of consumer detriment that corresponds to that particular ¸:
However, the implicit assumption in this formulation is that the market
structure does not vary with the structure of information.
² The model assumes that imperfect information leads to a parallel shift
in the observed demand and that marginal costs are constant. This was
necessary in order to derive an estimable measure of consumer detriment.24
² In order to be able to measure the degree of information precision in the
hands of consumers, according to the econometric method described in
Section 4, we had to restrict attention to cases where under imperfect in-
formation consumers over-estimate the quality of the product. The model
is therefore not appropriate to those cases where it is reasonable to assume
that imperfect information can lead to under-estimation of quality (e.g.
new products).
Estimation
In the analysis above we have provided two measures of the consumer detri-
ment, one for the short run and one for the long rung. These are given re-
spectively by equations (26) and (28). See Section 4 for a discussion on how to
estimate these equations.
4 Estimation approach
In this section we provide some insights as to how to estimate the expressions
for the consumer detriment derived in the report.
² Estimate of the markup pi¡MCipi
Nishimura et al. (1999) provide a method for estimating mark-up over
marginal cost at the ¯rm level, which can be used to estimate equations (7)
(10) (18) and (20).25 The method uses the following identity, based on two
measures of the output elasticity (see Nishimura et al.,1999 p.1086):
24See Hamilton (1999) for a more comprehensive theoretical case.
25Note that, once we have estimated the markup we can easily obtain an estaimate of
pi¡MC
MC
(for expression 7) and of pi
MC
(for expression 10) as follows . From the markup
pi¡MC
pi
; we can obtain an estimate of MC
pi
by making use of the fact that MC
pi
= 1¡ pi¡MC
pi
:
Then, we can calculate 1MC
pi
to obtain pi
MC
and hence pi¡MC
MC
; which is equal to pi
MC
¡ 1:
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¹([®K ]t + [®L]t) = (1 + °
Vt¡1
Qt
)(1¡ ´( ¢St
St¡1
)) (29)
Where ¹ is the mark up, ®j the Labour and Capital shares for j = L;K; Vt¡1
is last periods maximum output, Qt is output and St is a measure of size of
operation (for ease of exposition the ¯rm speci¯c index is suppressed). Taking
logs of (29):
log(¹) + log([®K ]t + [®L]t) = log(1 + °
Vt¡1
Qt
) + log(1¡ ´( ¢St
St¡1
))
By approximating the logarithms on the right side using a ¯rst order Taylor's
series, assuming 1 + ° Vt¡1Qt ' 0 and 1¡ ´( ¢StSt¡1 ) ' 0; it follows:
log(¹) + log([®K ]t + [®L]t) = °
Vt¡1
Qt
¡ ´( ¢St
St¡1
)
It is common to assume that the share depends on some other variables, such
as the cycle of the economy or market speci¯c factors, so that:
log(¹) = log(¹0) + Á log(xt)
Where xt is a single variable or a vector of variables. Substituting out for ¹:
log([®K ]t + [®L]t) = log(¹0) + Á log(xt) + °
Vt¡1
Qt
¡ ´( ¢St
St¡1
)
Nishimura et al. make the additional assumption that Vt¡1 ¼ &Q¤t ; where Q¤t
may be measured by trend output. Hence, the equation to be estimated is:
log([®K ]t + [®L]t) = log(¹0) + Á log(xt) + °
Q¤t
Qt
¡ ´( ¢St
St¡1
)
The equation estimated by Nishimura et al. takes the following form:
log([®K ]
jk
t + [®L]
jk
t ) = ®
jk
0 + ®
jk
1 market
jk
t + ®
jk
2 norcur
jk
t
+®jk3 scale
jk
t +
1994X
t=1972
®k4tY eart + u
jk
t
where market is the market condition of the ¯rm measured by the ratio of net
cash °ow to the asset value, norcur is Q
¤
t
Qt
measured as the ratio of trend to
actual sales, scale is the growth rate of the ¯rms scale, which is intended to
be a determinant of managerial experience and Y ear is a year dummy that is
supposed to capture transitory technological shocks.
Nishimura et al. estimate the above model using a Panel of ¯rms drawn from
21 industries over the time period 1971-1994. They conclude for the Japanese
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case, that imperfect competition is the predominant market structure. Given
ownership of UK ¯rms, globalization and some similarities between Japan and
the UK, then a similar conclusion might be relevant for the UK. Given the
possibility of measurement error in all the variable the model is estimated by
Instrumental Variables.26
The estimated equation does not allow for unmodelled heterogeneity in the
structure of the mark-up either across the sectors or the ¯rms. Clearly, the
measure of the mark-up might be suggestive of concentration or informational
market power. It is possible to include ¯rm speci¯c and industry speci¯c ¯xed
e®ects (i.e., see the model on page 1098 of Nisihimura et al.,1999). Nishimura
et al. also observed pro-cyclical behavior in the mark-up suggesting that such
measures would require regular updating.
Finally, the theoretical analysis discussed is essentially based on comparative
statics, which might be appropriate for a theoretical discourse of the type en-
gaged in here. However, the process generating the data might well be dynamic.
There is a plethora of literature that considers dynamic estimation of panels (Ar-
relano and Bond, 1991). In general such analysis assumes that the theoretical
basis of the dynamic process derives from solutions to forward looking expecta-
tional models (Hansen and Sargent, 1982; West, 1995). In general, from where
a dynamic derives is not an easy question to consider. This question has been
partly addressed in the Panel context by Arrelano et al. (1999), though Hunter
and Ioannidis (2000) call into question the assumption that forward looking
behavior can be simply identi¯ed from the existence of valid instruments.
One also needs to consider the appropriateness of selecting the di®erence
operator and excluding long-run information or the appropriateness of the initial
conditions (Blundel and Bond, 1998). The above paper considers what might
be called a Panel Cointegration case (Engle and Granger, 1987), which implies
that di®erence models are likely to be misspeci¯ed as under Cointegration there
is a partial over-di®erence when the series are non- stationary. Should the
relationship be static, then what is likely to be observed is the long-run behavior
of the data.
Data required for Estimating the Mark-up.
In Appendix A, Nishimura et al. (1999) describe carefully the calculations
of the variables used in the study. This can largely be replicated in the UK,
with the following adjustments. First, in estimating the capital stock K, they
exclude land because of the huge discrepancy between book and market values.
In the UK revaluation is permitted and therefore the exclusion is less necessary.
Second, the estimation of the rental price of capital stock includes an economic
rate of depreciation taken from KEO Data Base. This appears to be Japan
speci¯c and therefore we suggest to estimate depreciation rates with reference
to accounting depreciation as a ratio to ¯xed assets.
26Arrelano and Bond (1998) have a programme, DPD, which estimates dynamic panel data
models and provides appropriate tests of instrument selection and Serial Correlation.
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Critical review of the equations involving the estimate of the
mark-up based on accounting information alone
Equations (7), (8) and (10) are similar equations in form.
Equation (7) has the advantage of only depending on the calculation of
the mark-up based on the Nishimura estimator given above and knowledge of
revenues Ri and R
¤ both calculated from total sales. In particular, in order to
obtain a proxy for R¤, we can use two pieces of information: the mark-up and
the ratio ACiAC :When the ranking of ¯rms based on those pieces of information is
coherent, then we select the revenue of the ¯rm with the lowest ACiAC ratio. When
it is not coherent, then we look at a weighted average of these two measures to
select the ¯rm whose revenue is taken as proxy for R¤:
Moreover, if the suggestion in Nishimura et al. (1999) is valid, that MC =
AC for the e®ective range of the cost function generally observed, then equation
(8) can be calculated directly from data on pro¯ts, sales and total costs.
Equation (10) can be given the following form:
CD =
nX
i=1
1
2
fRi(1¡ ®i(1¡ ¹i)) +R¤(
1
®i(1¡ ¹i)
¡ 1)g
given the mark-up,¹i; Ri, R
¤ and a measure of ®i given by ACiAC ; where AC is
a measure of the average costs of the most e±cient ¯rm that can be obtained
by looking at the minimum cost producer in the industry. This is dependent on
the accuracy of the measure of ®i; which depends on proportionality between
the ratio ACiAC =
MCi
MC : The latter would appear less restrictive, than MC = AC
on which equation (8) is based. Hence, it would appear preferable to have some
measure of the mark-up in the CD measure to be used. In this light, (7) appears
the least restrictive, though it might well be compared with (10).
Equation (18) and (20) are based on the OFT de¯nition and yield a
correction of that formula. However, (18) requires in addition to the mark-up
the calculation of the demand elasticity, which would involve estimating demand
equations for each of the goods to be analyzed. Such analysis requires sales data
and some measure of price. Should it be necessary to make such calculation, the
degree of accuracy would be limited to an analysis at the level of CIB industrial
classi¯cation aggregate data, or it requires the type of study that is suggested
below for all goods in the economy. This leads us to consider (20), which still
requires the mark-up, but also this depends on a measure of ¸: Again, this
calculation might be based on some pre-existing measure of concentration in
the industries or it could be derived from the estimate of the markup. Equation
(20) depends on pro¯ts, sales, n; ¸ and ¹i:
² Estimate of µ; "µ for expressions (26) and (28).
In order to estimate µ and hence of "µ we need to obtain an estimate of the
`imputed' demand curve, that is the estimate of the price that - for the given
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quantity sold - would prevail in the market if there was no overestimate of the
quality embodied in the commodity.27 To this purpose, we suggest the following
procedure, that is based on the explicit incorporation of quality into the price
equation.
Following the approach taken by Houthakker (1951-1952) in order to in-
corporate the concept of quality into the consumption of a commodity we will
describe consumption of commodity fig by two variables: the physical quantity
qi and quality vi. The latter number which indicates the variety bought, is
de¯ned as the price per unit of 'that variety, under some basic price system.
The cost of qi units of quality vi will then be fqivig:
We seek to explain price changes which cause the cost of this consumption
fqi, vig to become qifai + bivig where ®i and bi are constants such that ®i > 0
and ®i+ bivi > 0 8 vi. That is, we decompose the observed price into `quantity
price' and `quality price'. The former is identical to the price of the good in
conventional consumer theory. The `quality price' shows the price di®erential
between di®erent qualities. Under the basic price system ®i = 0 and bi = 1.
The insight of Houthakker's observation is that the price of the commodity
could be divided into two `measurable' subcomponents; a component that relates
to the quantity consumed and another that relates to the level of `quality' within
the commodity. Thus, the price of a good can be de¯ned as :
pi = ®i + bivi
The parameter ®i represents the 'quantity price' and the parameter bi was
labeled the 'quality price' (see ¯gures 5 and 6).
Total consumer spending can thus be de¯ned as
Mi = (®i + bivi)qi
the slope of the constraint is given by
(
@qi
@vi
) = ¡[bi:Mi=(®i + bivi)2] < 0
and its curvature is given by
(
@2qi
@v2i
) = [2Mib
2
i =(®i + bivi)
3] > 0
Di®erentiating the constraint by dqidbi and
dvi
dbi
; we obtain
27Note that the estimate of "µ can be obtained once estimated µ; since the expression pµ in
"µ refers to the derivative of p with respect to µ. This is equal to 1 under the assumption that
imperfect quality information leads to a parallel shift in the observed demand function.
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dqi
dbi
= ¡[(viMi=(®i + bivi)2] < 0
and
dvi
dbi
= [(®iq
2
i ¡Miqi)=(biqi)2]normally < 0
Grilishes (1971) has shown that the use of the parameters ai; bi is the foun-
dation for the hedonic technique of adjusting prices indices for variation in
quality. This technique assumes that commodity prices pit are a function of a
set of `quality characteristics' fXjitg where the index j lists the characteristics.
When necessary due to quantitative limitations dummy variables are used for
theXjit. Di®erent functional forms are possible, however the semi-log functional
form seems to be better in describing the data, that is
log(p)it =
kX
j=0
®iXjit + uit
Houthakker's bij=(
@pi
@vit
) correspond to the ai coe±cients in the above equa-
tion.
In a series of papers Ioannidis and Silver (2000) and Ioannidis et al. (2001)
have estimated quality adjusted price indices for consumer durables such as
TV's and Video recorders. Their models included, in addition to the set of
characteristics, further explanatory variables, such as the quantity sold, thus
allowing for non-perfectly competitive markets. The estimated speci¯cations
are
log(p)it =
kX
j=0
®iXjit + °fz(q)git + uit
where the vector of additional variables z includes quantities sold and other
variables that used as proxies for the price cost-margin.
The presumption in this study is that consumers fail to appreciate correctly
the `quality' of the product, in fact they overestimate it, thus are paying higher
than otherwise prices. In the light of the evident failure of consumers to op-
timize, it is desirable to recast the hedonic analysis away from the traditional
functions towards frontiers. The econometric implication of the proposed re-
formulation from functions to frontiers is that the symmetrically distributed
stochastic error term with zero mean is no longer the appropriate speci¯cation
when analyzing this type of consumer behavior. By adopting frontier functions
we allow for the possibility (as an `equilibrium' position) that consumers will
end up paying above the deterministic kernel of the price function due to their
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postulated tendency to overestimate the `quality' of the commodity, this de-
¯ciency may be due to the operating environment (`exaggerating' advertising,
non-linear search cost, etc.). Stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) dates from a
series of paper published in 1977 (Meeusen and van den Broeck, 1977, Aigner et
al. 1977) and were applied to tests for allocative ine±ciency in production. For
a detailed summary and the theoretical foundations consult Kumbhakar and
Lovell (2000).
For this study we propose the stochastic frontier model:
log(p)it =
kX
j=0
®iXjit + °fz(q)git + uit ¡ µit
In this case uit is the two sided noise component and µit is the non-negative
component that captures the quality overestimate (i.e. µ in the previous sec-
tions). Since the error term has two components this frontier model is often
referred as the `composed error' model. It is assumed that E(uitµit) = 0 . The
error term
eit = uit ¡ µit
is asymmetric and it does not possess zero mean , by construction. Estima-
tion by OLS will not provide consistent estimates of the constant term, but
the remaining estimated coe±cients will be consistent. Schmidt and Lin (1984)
suggest an asymptotic test for the existence of negative skewness in the OLS
residuals. But in this case our interest lies in obtaining quantitative estimates
of the `overestimation' of quality rather than testing for its existence. To ob-
tain them we require explicit modeling of the composite error structure and
estimation by MLE.
Several options are available to us : a) normal, half-normal b) Normal,
exponential and c) Normal , truncated normal.
The empirical evidence to date supports the adoption of relatively simple
distribution such as half-normal and exponential, when modeling µit: Estimation
of the `ine±ciency' component can be undertaken using GMM and/or MLE
techniques.28
We postulate that the ¯tted values from the estimated equation, after the
subtraction of the ine±ciency component (µit) will constitute our measure of
prices that consumers would have paid had they not overestimated the quality of
the commodity. Finally, note that in the hedonic regression one the ° coe±cients
is associated with the quantities sold. This is taken to be equivalent to @p@Q in
Section 3.4. We can then evaluate the elasticity "Q at the point of interest .
Data requirements
28For an in depth discussion consult Greene (1993,1997).
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This approach can only be implemented on a product basis than on an
industry basis.29
In estimating quality adjusted price indices Ioannidis and Silver used EPOS
data (Electronic Point Of Sale). These data contain information for a broadly
de¯ned consumer durable such TV, Video recorder, PC, cars etc. The informa-
tion consists of
a) the price per model,
b) the model's technical characteristics (e.g.: The screen size (for TV's), the
Hard Disk capacity (for PC's),
c) the brand name (e.g. SONY, for TVs), DELL, for PCs),
d) the number of units sold,
e) other information such stocks held etc.30
5 Conclusions
In this report we have discussed di®erent models and estimating techniques to
measure the consumer detriment due to the presence of imperfect information
about prices and quality. In particular, in Section 2 we have provided a sim-
ple measure of consumer detriment for the case of imperfect price information
given by equations (7), (8) and (10). In Section 3 we have analyzed the case
of imperfect quality information and discussed two alternative approaches to
measure the consumer detriment for this case, leading respectively to equations
(18), (20), and (26), (28). Some of these equations involve unobservable com-
ponents. In particular, R¤ and µ can only be approximated from observed data.
For equations (7), (8) and (10) one can extract an estimate of R¤ using publicly
available accounting data at the ¯rm level, employing the method in Nishimura
et al. (1999), as discussed in Section 4. In contrast, the estimate of µ in equa-
tions (26) and (28) requires EPOS type data by broadly de¯ned product group.
The econometric technique of stochastic frontier hedonic functions is suggested
in order to obtain and estimate of µ and the other parameters involved in (26)
and (28).
In principle, it is possible to estimate all of the equations discussed above.
However, the data requirements, theoretical rigor and econometric complexity
di®er considerably. The quality of any results is likely to be a®ected by the
assumptions and approximations made. As far as estimating the e®ect of im-
perfect information about price is concerned, then either (7) or (10) are preferred
29However, note that the important methodological point in this section is the de¯nition of
`product' . As we refer in the text we have adopted the notion of `broadly de¯ned products'.
Such a product is, for example color televisions. This product is de¯ned by a set of charac-
teristics. One of then screen size covers the whole range of CTVs in the market. A producer
may be in the TV market with a whole range of TV's, that will all be accounted for as the
index of screen sizes covers the `broadly de¯ned product'. What is of importance in this case,
is that there exists a characteristic that can span the whole of the 'product' range. In the
example we o®er, we also suggest that it is important to account for the quantities sold for
each screen size by every ¯rm.
30For a full discussion please consult Ioannidis and Silver (2001).
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to (8) as they are less restrictive; but they require estimates of the mark-up.
From a theoretical perspective calculating consumer detriment due to imper-
fect information about quality is more satisfactory when either (26) or (28) are
used. However, (26) and (28) rely on estimates of (µ), a relatively complex
econometric method and collection of data on product prices and sales. Should
the mark-up have already been calculated, then (20) could be used directly to
compute consumer detriment, though a simple calculation would rely on some
strong assumptions about market structure.
6 Appendix
² ENTRY
In this appendix we derive the long run equilibrium for the model discussed
in Section 3.4.1. Denote by F the level of sunk costs and by c the level of average
costs: The demand function is given by
p(Q; s; µ) = a¡ bQ
where a = A+ µ; and µ represents the vertical di®erence between the observed
demand and the true demand.
From pro¯t maximization and simple calculations we obtain the following
equilibrium variables
q =
a¡ c
b (n+ 1+ ¸)
Q =
n (a¡ c)
b (n+ 1+ ¸)
p =
a (1 + ¸) + nc
(n+ 1+ ¸)
p¡ c = (a¡ c) (1 + ¸)
(n+ 1+ ¸)
It follows that the level of pro¯t of each of the ¯rm in the market is given by
¼i =
(a¡ c)2 (1 + ¸)
b (n+ 1+ ¸)2
(30)
In this setting the long run equilibrium number of ¯rms solves
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¼i = F
which in light of (30), yields an implicit expression for the number of ¯rms, as
given by
(n+ 1+ ¸)
2 =
(a¡ c)2 (1 + ¸)
bF
(31)
It follows that
CD =
@CD
@µ
¢µ =
dp
dµ
Q¢µ + b
µ
dQ
dµ
¶2
(¢µ)2
where:
dp
dµ
=
@p
@µ
+
@p
@n
@n
@µ
dQ
dµ
=
@Q
@µ
+
@Q
@n
@n
@µ
and where from (31)
@n
@µ
=
(a¡ c)(¸+ 1)
(¸+ 1+ n)bF
Simple calculations show that dpdµ = 0 and
dQ
dµ =
1
b so that:
CD =
@CD
@µ
¢µ =
1
2
1
@p
@Q
(¢µ)2 =
1
2
1
b
(¢µ)2
Finally, multiplying the right hand side of the above equation by p
2Qµ2
p2Qµ2
pµpµ;
and recalling that pµ = 1 and ¢µ = µ; we obtain:
CD =
1
2
"Q"
2
µpQ
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Figure 1: Consumer Detriment per individual ¯rm
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Figure 2: Consumer Detriment in the OFT model
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Figure 3: Our approach: Consumer Detriment in the short run
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Figure 4: Our approach: Consumer Detriment in the long run.
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Figure 6: Price quality relationship against basic price system
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